Campaign contributions and local public goods in a federation
I develop a voting model of decentralized provision of local public goods (LPGs) with campaign contributions. I compare an economy with and without campaign contributions: in the former economy, local govern- ments do not provide Pareto efficient LPGs and do not maximize the welfare gains associated...
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Main Author: | Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl Alberto |
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Format: | Artículo |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
2018
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/archivo/EstudiosEconomicos2018/283-311Ponce.pdf |
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