The politics of fiscal federalism: Building a stronger decentralization theorem
We explore how party structures can condition the benefits of decentralization in modern democracies. In particular, we study the interaction of two political institutions: democratic (de)centralization (whether a country has fiscally autonomous and elected local governments) and party (non)integrat...
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Main Author: | Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl Alberto |
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Other Authors: | Hankla, Charles, Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge |
Format: | Artículo |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2020
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629820956287 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0951629820956287#articleCitationDownloadContainer |
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