Comparative analysis of optimal conditional transfers in a fiscally centralized federation
The international evidence shows that the spending of sub-national governments depends on unconditional transfers from the central government. This evidence makes relevant the following question: What is the optimal design of inter-governmental transfers? In this article we provide an answer to this...
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Glavni autori: | José Antonio Carrillo Viramontes, Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez |
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Format: | Artículo |
Jezik: | spa |
Izdano: |
Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez
2021
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Online pristup: | http://erevistas.uacj.mx/ojs/index.php/noesis/article/view/253 |
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