Comparative analysis of optimal conditional transfers in a fiscally centralized federation
The international evidence shows that the spending of sub-national governments depends on unconditional transfers from the central government. This evidence makes relevant the following question: What is the optimal design of inter-governmental transfers? In this article we provide an answer to this...
में बचाया:
मुख्य लेखकों: | José Antonio Carrillo Viramontes, Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez |
---|---|
स्वरूप: | Artículo |
भाषा: | spa |
प्रकाशित: |
Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez
2021
|
विषय: | |
ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | http://erevistas.uacj.mx/ojs/index.php/noesis/article/view/253 |
टैग : |
टैग जोड़ें
कोई टैग नहीं, इस रिकॉर्ड को टैग करने वाले पहले व्यक्ति बनें!
|
समान संसाधन
-
Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism. A Fine Balance
द्वारा: Hankla, Charles R.
प्रकाशित: (2019) -
The politics of fiscal federalism: Building a stronger decentralization theorem
द्वारा: Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl Alberto
प्रकाशित: (2020) -
Social Weights and the Regional Allocation of Inter-Governmental Transfers
द्वारा: Ponce Rodríguez, Raúl Alberto
प्रकाशित: (2019) -
Transferencias intergubernamentales óptimas para tres niveles de gobierno.
द्वारा: Holguín Delgado, Gabriela
प्रकाशित: (2021) -
Fiscal discipline: Fiscal policy limits for encourage development in Mexico
द्वारा: Patricia Carmina Inzunza Mejía, और अन्य
प्रकाशित: (2021)